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Second-Price Auctions
Abstract
This paper analyzes the e⁄ects of buyer and seller risk aversion in ￿rst and second-
price auctions. The setting is the classic one of symmetric and independent private
values, with ex ante homogeneous bidders. However, the seller is able to optimally
set the reserve price. In both auctions the seller￿ s optimal reserve price is shown
to decrease in his own risk aversion, and more so in the ￿rst-price auction. Thus,
greater seller risk aversion increases the ex post e¢ ciency of both auctions, and
especially that of the ￿rst-price auction. The seller￿ s optimal reserve price in the
￿rst-price, but not in the second-price, auction decreases in the buyers￿risk aversion.
Thus, greater buyer risk aversion also increases the ex post e¢ ciency of the ￿rst but
not the second-price auction. At the interim stage, the ￿rst-price auction is preferred
by all buyer types in a lower interval, as well as by the seller.
Keywords: ￿rst-price auction, second-price auction, risk aversion, reserve price
JEL classi￿cation: D44
11 Introduction
Much of the literature that compares the e⁄ects of risk aversion across auctions
assumes each auction has the same, exogenously determined reserve price. The
predominant example is the comparison of a ￿rst-price auction (FPA) to a second-
price auction (SPA) with the same reserve price, in a symmetric independent private
values setting.1 The well-known result in this case is that risk averse bidders bid
more in the FPA than they do in the SPA.2
However, the reserve price in most real auctions is set by the seller. To the
extent that it in￿ uences bidding behavior and depends on the type of auction, the
endogeneity of the reserve price should be taken into account. In particular, the
comparative statics of the optimal reserve price are of direct interest because they
bear on ex post e¢ ciency. Lowering the reserve price decreases the probability of the
ine¢ cient event in which no sale occurs because the maximum value of the bidders
exceeds the seller￿ s value but not the reserve price.
This paper focuses on the e⁄ects of buyer and seller risk aversion on the seller￿ s
optimal reserve price in standard ￿rst and second-price auctions. Sharp results are
obtained by restricting attention to the otherwise simplest setting, that of symmetric
and independent private values. Our three main results are Theorems 1 ￿ 3:
Theorem 1 establishes that if the seller and/or the buyers are risk averse,
then the seller sets a lower reserve price in the FPA than in the SPA. This is in
contrast to when all parties are risk neutral, in which case the revenue equivalence
theorem implies that the seller￿ s optimal reserve price is the same in both auctions.
1We use the term FPA for both the ￿rst-price sealed-bid auction and the strategically equivalent
Dutch (descending) auction. We use the term SPA for both the second-price sealed-bid (Vickrey)
auction and the ￿button￿ model of the English ascending-bid auction, as they have the same
dominant strategy equilibria in our private values setting. (Milgrom and Weber, 1982).
2This and related results are established, e.g., by Holt (1980), Riley and Samuelson (1981),
Harris and Raviv (1981), Milgrom and Weber (1982), Matthews (1983, 1987), Maskin and Riley
(1984), Cox et al.(1982, 1988), Smith and Levin (1996), and Eso and White (2004).
2Risk aversion thus makes the FPA more ex post e¢ cient than the SPA. The result
hinges on how the FPA equilibrium bid function is a⁄ected by a marginal increase
in the reserve price. Risk averse bidders increase their bids less than do risk neutral
bidders, and a risk averse seller values the increase in the bids of the high bidders
relatively less than does a risk neutral seller because of diminishing marginal utility.
Both forces lower the seller￿ s marginal incentive to raise the reserve price.
Theorem 2 establishes that in either auction, a more risk averse seller sets a
lower reserve price. Thus, the more risk averse the seller, the more ex post e¢ cient
are both auctions. The intuition is straightforward: a more risk averse seller values
more (on the margin) a decrease in the risk of not selling the object. The proof,
however, is surprisingly intricate.3
Theorem 3 establishes that in the FPA, the seller sets a lower reserve price
if the bidders are more risk averse. (Bidder risk aversion does not a⁄ect the SPA
equilibrium.) This theorem requires more assumptions: either (a) the reverse hazard
rate function of the buyers￿values is decreasing, and the buyers and/or the seller
exhibit nonincreasing absolute risk aversion, or (b) the buyers exhibit constant ab-
solute risk aversion. Under these conditions the rate at which the FPA bid function
increases in the reserve price is smaller when the bidders are more risk averse, and
so the seller has less incentive to raise the reserve price. This e⁄ect is stronger if the
seller is also risk averse, as then the fact that more risk averse bidders bid higher than
less risk averse bidders implies that the seller has a lower marginal utility valuation
for the increase in their bids caused by an increase in the reserve price.
The remainder of the paper begins with the model in Section 2. Useful techni-
cal results are in Section 3. The FPA equilibrium is studied in Section 4. The seller￿ s
preferences over auctions with the same reserve price are determined in Section 5,
and his optimal reserve prices are examined in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
3Theorem 3 in Waehrer et al. (1998) is our Theorem 2 for the case of risk neutral bidders (and
a more general information structure). Their proof relies on a point-by-point renormalization of
the utility functions that we do not understand. Our proof takes a di⁄erent approach.
32 Model
An indivisible object is to be possibly sold to one of n ￿ 2 potential buyers through
either a FPA or a SPA with a reserve price. Each buyer i 2 N = f1;:::;ng has
a private value for the object, vi; which is unknown to the others. Ex ante, these
values are independently distributed on an interval [L;H] according to the same
distribution function F, which has a density function f = F 0 that is strictly positive
on [L;H] and continuously di⁄erentiable on (L;H). Some of our results are obtained




strictly decreases on (L;H).
Each participant maximizes expected utility. Each buyer has the same utility
function, uB : R ! R. If a buyer with value v wins and pays a price b; his utility
is uB(v ￿ b); his utility is uB(0) if he loses.4 We assume uB is twice continuously
di⁄erentiable, with u0
B > 0 and u00
B ￿ 0, and normalized so that uB(0) = 0:
The seller has a value v0 2 [L;H) for the object, and a twice continuously
di⁄erentiable utility function, uS : R ! R; satisfying u0
S > 0 and u00
S ￿ 0: The
seller￿ s utility is uS(b) if a sale occurs at price b; and it is uS(v0) otherwise.
We consider ￿rst and second-price auctions with a reserve price r 2 (L;H).5
In either auction a buyer with a value v < r abstains from bidding. In a SPA, the
dominant strategy of a buyer with v ￿ r is to submit a bid equal to v: We restrict
attention to this equilibrium of the SPA.
Turning to the FPA, it is useful to de￿ne G ￿ F n￿1: If a buyer has value v;
then G(v) is the probability that every other buyer has a lower value. Let g ￿ G0
be the associated density, and let ‘(v) = g(v)=G(v): Lastly, for i = B;S; de￿ne
4A more general formulation would have uB = u(v;￿b) as the winning bidder￿ s payo⁄. Under
appropriate assumptions, as in Maskin and Riley (1984) or Matthews (1987), our main results
would extend to this generalization.
5This is without loss of generality. As we shall see, v0 2 [L;H) implies that the seller￿ s optimal
reserve price is in (L;H):
4the function ￿ = uB=u0
B. Then b(v;r), the unique symmetric equilibrium bidding





= ‘(v)￿(v ￿ b); (1)
that satis￿es the initial condition b(r;r) = r (e.g., Maskin and Riley, 1984). We
restrict attention to this equilibrium of the FPA.6 Observe that b1(r;r) = 0; and
b2(r;r) = 1 ￿ b1(r;r) = 1:
If uB satis￿es CARA, so that RB ￿ a for some a ￿ 0; we let ba denote the FPA



















for v ￿ r: (2)
From (2) we see that for CARA buyers, the equilibrium bid function strictly increases







￿a(b￿r) > 0; (3)
and that increasing the risk aversion of the bidders lowers the rate at which the bid
function increases in the reserve price: for all v > r; @ba
2=@a = (r ￿ b)ba
2 < 0:
3 Technical Preliminaries
For i = B;S; we let Ri = ￿u00
i=u0
i denote the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk
aversion. The function ￿ = uB=u0
B is related to RB by the equation ￿0 = 1 + RB￿:
Because of the normalization uB(0) = 0; for t ￿ 0 we have ￿(t) ￿ 0; and hence
￿0(t) > 0: It is well known that if ^ uB is another utility function such that ^ uB(0) = 0
and b RB > RB; then ^ ￿(t) > ￿(t) for t > 0 (Pratt, 1964, Theorem 1).
We make repeated use of the following two lemmas, which are proved in the
Appendix. The ￿rst is a variation of the ￿Ranking Lemma￿of Milgrom (2004).
6It is the unique equilibrium if RB is nonincreasing (Maskin and Riley, 2003).
5Lemma 1 For c < d ￿ 1 and h : [c;d] ! R di⁄erentiable, if h(c) ￿ 0 then
(i) h ￿ 0 on (c;d] if [8t ￿ c; h(t) ￿ 0 ) h0(t) ￿ 0],
(ii) h > 0 on (c;d] if [8t ￿ c; h(t) = 0 ) h0(t) > 0],
(iii) h > 0 on (c;d] if [8t > c; h(t) ￿ 0 ) h0(t) > 0].
Lemma 2 For c < d ￿ 1 and i = 1;2; let the functions hi : [c;d] ! R be
di⁄erentiable and satisfy h0
1 < h0
2 on (c;d): Let ti maximize hi on [c;d]: Then, if
ti 2 (c;d) for i = 1 or i = 2; we have t1 < t2:
4 Properties of the FPA Equilibrium
The following are well known and easily proved properties of the FPA equilibrium:
b(v;r) < v; b1(v;r) > 0; and b2(v;r) ￿ 0 for any L < r < v:7 As we are concerned
with the seller￿ s incentives for setting the reserve price, we need to further determine
how the equilibrium varies with the reserve price. Our ￿rst proposition establishes
an upper bound on b2(v;r): This derivative is equal to G(r)=G(v) if the bidders are
risk neutral, as can be seen by setting a = 0 in (3). This is in fact the upper bound.
Proposition 1 For v > r; b2(v;r) ￿ G(r)=G(v): This inequality is strict if RB > 0:8
Proof. For a ￿xed r 2 (L;H); let h(v) = G(r) ￿ b2(v;r)G(v): Then h0(v) =
￿g(v)b2 ￿G(v)b12: Di⁄erentiating (1) with respect to r yields b12 = ￿(1+RB￿)‘b2;
where RB and ￿ are evaluated at v ￿ b(v;r) > 0: This and ‘ = g(v)=G(v) yield
h
0(v) = RB￿g(v)b2 ￿ 0: (4)
Hence, since h(r) = 0; we have h(v) ￿ 0, and so b2 ￿ G(r)=G(v); for v > r: Now
assume RB > 0: We apply Lemma 2(iii) to h on [r;H]: Suppose h(v) ￿ 0 for some
7Applying parts (ii) and (i) of Lemma 1, respectively, to b1(￿;r) and b2(￿;r) yields b1 > 0 and
b2 ￿ 0 for v > r; using (1) to obtain b11 and b12: Then b < v for v > r follows from (1) and b1 > 0:
8Here and below, RB > 0 is a functional inequality, meaning that RB(y) > 0 for all y in the
relevant interval, which is [0;H ￿ L]:
6v > r: At this (v;r); we have b2 ￿ G(r)=G(v) > 0: It follows that h0(v) > 0; since
each term in (4) (evaluated at this v) is positive. Now Lemma 2(iii) implies that in
fact, h > 0; and so b2 < G(r)=G(v); for v > r:
Our second proposition concerns the implications of a decreasing reverse haz-
ard rate. Given (DRH), part (i) of Proposition 2 shows that the bid function in-
creases in the reserve price (as we have already seen is true if uB is CARA). Part
(ii) establishes the intuitive property that a bidder￿ s pro￿t conditional on winning,
v ￿ b(v;r); increases in v. The proof of Proposition 2 is at the end of this section.
Proposition 2 If (DRH) holds, then the FPA equilibrium satis￿es, for v > r;
(i) b2(v;r) > 0, and
(ii) b1(v;r) < 1.
Our third proposition determines the e⁄ects of the bidders becoming more
risk averse. Part (i) shows that the bid function increases in their risk aversion,
generalizing the well-known result that bids are higher when the bidders are risk
averse than when they are risk neutral. The remainder of the proposition establishes
more surprising results, assuming that (DRH) holds, and the seller and/or the buyers
exhibit nonincreasing absolute risk aversion. Parts (ii) and (iii), respectively, show
that then, the more risk averse are the bidders, the more rapidly the bid function
increases in a bidder￿ s value, but the more slowly it increases in the reserve price.
The latter property is largely why the seller￿ s optimal reserve price decreases in the
risk aversion of the bidders, as we shall see.
Proposition 3 Let ^ uB be another function satisfying the same assumptions as uB,
with an absolute risk aversion measure satisfying b RB > RB on [0;H ￿ L]: Then
(i) ^ b(v;r) > b(v;r) for v > r:
If (DRH) holds, and RB and/or b RB is nonincreasing, then
(ii) ^ b1(v;r) > b1(v;r) for v > r; and
(iii) ^ b2(v;r) < b2(v;r) for v > r:
7Proofs of Propositions 2 and 3. It is e¢ cient to prove the parts in a certain
order. Let P2i refer to Proposition 2(i); etc.
P2ii: We apply Lemma 1(ii) to 1 ￿ b1(￿;r): Recall 1 ￿ b1(r;r) > 0: Suppose
1 ￿ b1 = 0 at some v ￿ r: Then v > r: Di⁄erentiating (1) with respect to v; and
evaluating the result at this (v;r); yields
b11 = ‘
0￿ + ‘￿
0(1 ￿ b1) = ‘
0￿:
We have ￿(v ￿ b) > 0 because b < v; and ‘0(v) < 0 by (DRH). Hence, at this (v;r);
@ [1 ￿ b1]=@v = ￿b11 > 0: Lemma 1(ii) now implies that for any v ￿ r; 1 ￿ b1 > 0:
P3i: We apply Lemma 1(iii) to ^ b(￿;r) ￿ b(￿;r): We have ^ b(r;r) = b(r;r).
Suppose ^ b ￿ b for some v > r: Then ^ ￿(v￿^ b) ￿ ^ ￿(v￿b); since ^ ￿ is increasing on R+:
Since b RB > RB on [0;H￿L]; we have ^ ￿(v￿b) > ￿(v￿b). Hence, ^ ￿(v￿^ b) > ￿(v￿b):
This and (1) yields
^ b1 ￿ b1 =
h
^ ￿(v ￿^ b) ￿ ￿(v ￿ b)
i
‘(v) > 0:
Lemma 1(iii) now implies ^ b > b for all v > r.
P3ii: We apply Lemma 1(ii) to^ b1(￿;r)￿b1(￿;r) on intervals of the form [￿k;H];
where ￿k # r as k ! 1: We will show that ^ b1(￿;r) > b1(￿;r) on each interval, and
hence on (r;H]: To obtain ￿k; let fvkg be a sequence such that vk # r: Since ^ b(r;r) =
b(r;r) and ^ b(vk;r) > b(vk;r); the mean value theorem implies ￿k 2 (r;vk) exists such
that ^ b1(￿k;r) > b1(￿k;r). Note that ￿k # r: Now, suppose ^ b1(v;r) = b1(v;r) for some
v ￿ ￿k: Since RB or b RB is nonincreasing and ^ b > b at (v;r); we have
b RB(v ￿^ b) > RB(v ￿ b): (5)
Because ^ b1 = b1 at (v;r); from (1) we obtain ^ ￿(v ￿^ b) = ￿(v ￿ b): Hence, using (1)
to di⁄erentiate ^ b1 and b1 yields
^ b11 ￿ b11 =
h
‘
0^ ￿ + ‘
￿





0￿ + ‘(1 + RB￿)(1 ￿ b1)]
=
h
b RB(v ￿^ b) ￿ RB(v ￿ b)
i
^ b1(1 ￿^ b1) > 0;
8where the inequality follows from (5), ^ b1 > 0; and ^ b1 < 1 (by Proposition 2(ii); since
we have (DRH) here). Lemma 1(ii) now implies ^ b1(￿;r) > b1(￿;r) on each (￿k;H]:
P2i: The continuity of RB implies the existence of a < 1 such that a > RB
on [0;H ￿L]: Let ^ b be the equilibrium for a CARA ^ uB with b RB ￿ a: Then ^ b is given
by (2) and satis￿es ^ b2 > 0 for any v ￿ r: We apply Lemma 1(iii) to b2(￿;r)￿^ b2(￿;r):
We have b2(r;r) = ^ b2(r;r): Suppose b2 ￿ ^ b2 for some v > r: As (1) holds for both b1
and ^ b1; di⁄erentiating b1 ￿^ b1 with respect to r yields
b12 ￿^ b12 = ￿(1 + RB￿)‘b2 + (1 + b RB^ ￿)‘^ b2
= ￿(‘ + RBb1)b2 + (‘ + b RB^ b1)^ b2
=
￿
^ b2 ￿ b2
￿
‘ + b RB^ b1^ b2 ￿ RBb1b2:
Thus, because b2 ￿ ^ b2 and ‘ > 0;
b12 ￿^ b12 ￿
￿
b RB^ b1 ￿ RBb1
￿
^ b2: (6)
Since (DRH) holds and b RB is a constant function, Proposition 3(ii) implies ^ b1 > b1.
Our choice of b RB = a implies b RB > RB. Thus, since ^ b2 > 0; from (6) we obtain
b12 ￿^ b12 > 0: Lemma 1(iii) now implies b2 > ^ b2; and hence b2 > 0; for v > r.
P3iii: This proof follows that of (P2i); applying Lemma 1(iii) to b2(￿;r) ￿
^ b2(￿;r): Again b2(r;r) = ^ b2(r;r); and if b2 ￿ ^ b2 for some v > r; then (6) holds at
(v;r): Since (DRH) holds and RB or b RB is nonincreasing, Proposition 3(ii) implies
^ b1 > b1. Furthermore, as (5) holds, b RB > RB. Lastly, we now have ^ b2 > 0 by
Proposition 2(i): Thus, we again obtain b12 ￿ ^ b12 > 0 from (6). Lemma 1(iii) now
implies b2 > ^ b2 for all v > r.
5 Seller Preferences over Auctions with the Same
Reserve Price
Let i = I;II denote, respectively, the FPA and the SPA, and let Vi(r) be the seller￿ s
equilibrium expected utility in auction i with reserve price r: The revenue equivalence
9theorem establishes that VI(r) = VII(r) if all participants are risk neutral.
As shown by Maskin and Riley (1984), risk aversion on the part of the seller
and/or the buyers causes the seller to prefer the FPA to the SPA if both have the
same reserve price.9 This is due to two e⁄ects. The ￿rst is a direct ￿revenue e⁄ect￿ :
buyer risk aversion causes them to bid more in the FPA. The second is a ￿risk
e⁄ect￿ : the high bid in a FPA is a less risky random variable than it is in a SPA,
and so preferred by a risk averse seller.
For future reference we record this result as part (i) of the following proposition.
Part (ii) records the result that in a FPA, the seller prefers the buyers to be more
risk averse, a consequence of the fact that they then bid more.
Proposition 4 (i) If RB and/or RS is positive, then VI(r) > VII(r) for r < H:
(ii) If ^ uB satis￿es the same assumptions as uB, with b RB > RB; and b VI(r) is
the corresponding FPA equilibrium seller payo⁄, then b VI(r) > VI(r) for r < H:
Proof. Part (i) follows from Theorem 5 in Maskin and Riley (1984). To prove (ii);
￿x r < H and (v1;:::;vn) 2 [L;H]n: Let vm = maxi vi: In either case, uB or ^ uB; a
sale occurs if and only if vm ￿ r: The price is then b(vm;r) or ^ b(vm;r); since b1 and
^ b1 are positive. By Proposition 3(i); ^ b(v;r) > b(v;r) for v > r: Thus, for almost all
value vectors resulting in a sale, the sale price is higher given ^ uB than uB: Since a
sale occurs with positive probability because r < H; we have b VI(r) > VI(r):
The seller￿ s preferences over auctions with the same ￿xed reserve price extend
immediately to the setting in which the seller sets reserve prices. For example, if
RB and/or RS is positive, and rI (rII) is an optimal reserve price for the seller in
the FPA (SPA), then Proposition 4(i) immediately implies VI(rI) > VII(rII):
9Related results are in Vickrey (1961), Matthews (1980), Riley and Samuelson (1981), Waehrer
et al. (1998), and Milgrom (2004, Theorem 4.10).
106 Optimal Reserve Prices
We now derive expressions for Vi(r) and V 0
i (r) in order to study the seller￿ s optimal






VII(r) = nG(r)(1 ￿ F(r))uS(r) + n
Z H
r










S(b(v;r))b2(v;r)G(v)dF(v) ￿ nG(r)f(r)[uS(r) ￿ uS(v0)]: (9)
The ￿rst term in (9) is the seller￿ s marginal bene￿t from raising the reserve price in
the FPA, due to the resulting increase in the bid function on [r;H]: The second term
is the marginal cost, due to the lost sales at price b(r;r) = r caused by a marginal




II(r) = nG(r)(1 ￿ F(r))u
0
S(r) ￿ nG(r)f(r)[uS(r) ￿ uS(v0)]: (10)
Again, the ￿rst and second terms are the seller￿ s marginal bene￿t and marginal cost
of raising the reserve price. Comparing (9) to (10) shows that the marginal cost is
the same in the SPA as in the FPA. The marginal bene￿t of raising the reserve price
in the SPA di⁄ers, as it is due to the resulting increase in the price received in the
event that precisely one bidder has a value greater than r:
Let Ri denote the set of reserve prices that maximize Vi(r): The next propo-
sition establishes that in both auctions, optimal reserve prices exist and are in the
interval (v0;H): Furthermore, the optimal reserve price in the SPA is unique and in-
variant to the number of bidders under the regularity assumption of Myerson (1981),
that a bidder￿ s virtual valuation increases in his value.









11From (10) we obtain V 0
II(r) = nG(r)f(r)u0
S(r)￿(r):
Proposition 5 Both RI and RII are nonempty subsets of (v0;H): Any rII 2 RII
satis￿es ￿(rII) = 0; and RII is a singleton and independent of the number of bidders
if v ￿
1￿F(v)
f(v) is strictly increasing on (L;H):
Proof. The ￿rst term in (9) is nonnegative for r ￿ H; since b2 ￿ 0: Hence, from this
and (10) we see that Vi is constant on (￿1;L]; and V 0
i > 0 on (L;v0): For r ￿ H;
Vi(r) = uS(v0); and V 0
i (H) < 0: Thus, any ri 2 Ri is in (v0;H): We know Ri 6= ;
because [v0;H] is compact and Vi is continuous. Any rII 2 RII satis￿es V 0
II(rII) = 0















The ￿rst term is nonpositive for r ￿ v0: Hence, if v ￿
1￿F(v)
f(v) is strictly increasing,
then ￿0 < 0 on [v0;H]: This interval then contains a unique rII satisfying ￿(rII) = 0;
and so RII = frIIg: Since ￿ does not depend on n; neither does this rII:
We now show that the seller sets a lower reserve price in the FPA than in the
SPA if he and/or the bidders are risk averse. The proof is based on the observation
that because the seller￿ s marginal cost of raising the reserve price is the same in both
auctions, the di⁄erence in his incentives is the di⁄erence in the marginal bene￿ts:



















It is easy to see that this di⁄erence is negative if the bidders and/or the seller is
risk averse. By the revenue equivalence theorem, V 0
I(r) = V 0
II(r) if they are all risk
neutral, and so then MBI = MBII. As the seller becomes risk averse, the ratio
u0
S(b(v;r))=u0
S(r) falls because b(v;r) > r; and hence MBI falls relative to MBII:
As the bidders become risk averse, b2 falls by Proposition 1, which lowers MBI and
leaves MBII unchanged. The proof of our ￿rst theorem makes this logic precise.
12Theorem 1 Suppose RB and/or RS is positive. Then, for any rI 2 RI and rII 2
RII; we have rI < rII:























Since r > v0 ￿ L; this expression is positive if and only if the integral is positive. Fix
v > r: Since b(v;r) > r and uS is concave we have u0
S(b(v;r))=u0
S(r) ￿ 1; and this
inequality is strict if RS > 0: From Proposition 1 we have G(v)b2(v;r)=G(r) ￿ 1;
and this inequality is strict if RB > 0: Hence, as at least one of RS and RB is
positive, the integrand in the above expression is negative at all v 2 (r;H]: This
proves V 0
I < V 0
II on (L;H): Since rII 2 (v0;H) by Proposition 5, Lemma 2 now
implies rI < rII:
Our second theorem shows that in either auction, a more risk averse seller sets
a lower reserve price. The intuition is that the more risk averse the seller is, the
more he wishes to avoid the risk of not selling the object for a pro￿table price.
Theorem 2 Let ^ uS satisfy the same assumptions as uS, with b RS > RS: Let b Ri and
Ri be the sets of optimal reserve prices given ^ uS and uS; for i = I;II: Then, for
any ^ ri 2 b Ri and ri 2 Ri; we have ^ rI < rI and ^ rII < rII:
Proof. We ￿rst prove ^ rII < rII: W.l.o.g., we may assume ^ rII = max b RII: It is
convenient to normalize ^ uS so that ^ uS(v0) = uS(v0) and ^ uS(^ rII) = uS(^ rII): Then,
since b RS > RS; by Pratt (1964, Theorem 1) we have
uS(y) < ^ uS(y) for y 2 (v0; ^ rII): (13)
From (8) we obtain VII(r) ￿ b VII(r) = T1(r) + T2(r); where




[uS(y) ￿ ^ uS(y)](1 ￿ F(y))dG(y):
13Let r 2 (v0; ^ rII): Then (13) implies T1(r) < 0 = T1(^ rII) and T2(r) < T2(^ rII): Hence,
VII(r) ￿ b VII(r) < VII(^ rII) ￿ b VII(^ rII): We conclude that for all r 2 (v0; ^ rII);
VII(^ rII) ￿ VII(r) > b VII(^ rII) ￿ b VII(r) ￿ 0;
where the second inequality follows from ^ rII 2 b RII. This proves ^ rII ￿ rII. Now,
again by Pratt (1964, Theorem 1), for any y > v0 we have








Hence, using ^ uS in (11) to de￿ne b ￿; b ￿(r) < ￿(r) for r > v0: This and Proposition
5 imply ￿(^ rII) > b ￿(^ rII) = 0 = ￿(rII); and so ^ rII 6= rII: Thus, ^ rII < rII:
We now use a similiar approach to prove ^ rI < rI. W.l.o.g., we may assume
^ rI = max b RI: Normalize ^ uS so that ^ uS(v0) = uS(v0) and ^ uS(^ rI) = uS(^ rI): Then,
from b RS > RS we have uS(y) < ^ uS(y) for y 2 (v0; ^ rI); and uS(y) > ^ uS(y) for







^ uS(y) ￿ ^ uS(v0)
:
We thus have u0
S(y) > ^ u0
S(y) for y > ^ rI; using ^ uS(v0) = uS(v0) and uS(y) > ^ uS(y):
This implies that for v0 < r ￿ ^ rI < v;
uS(b(v; ^ rI)) ￿ ^ uS(b(v; ^ rI)) > uS(b(v;r)) ￿ ^ uS(b(v;r))
holds if b(v;r) > ^ rI (since b2 ￿ 0): This inequality holds also if b(v;r) ￿ ^ rI; since
then its right side is nonpositive, but its left side is positive because b(v; ^ rI) > ^ rI:
From (7) we therefore obtain, for r 2 (v0; ^ rI),
VI(^ rI) ￿ b VI(^ rI) = n
Z H
^ rI




[uS(b(v;r)) ￿ ^ uS(b(v;r))]G(v)dF(v):
Observe that for v0 < r < v < ^ rI; we have b(v;r) < b(^ rI;r) < ^ rI; and so uS(b(v;r)) <
^ uS(b(v;r)). This implies that for r 2 (v0; ^ rI),
Z ^ rI
r
[uS(b(v;r)) ￿ ^ uS(b(v;r))]G(v)dF(v) < 0:
14The two previous displays yield, for any r 2 (v0; ^ rI),
VI(^ rI) ￿ b VI(^ rI) > n
Z H
r
[uS(b(v;r)) ￿ ^ uS(b(v;r))]G(v)dF(v)
= VI(r) ￿ b VI(r):
This implies VI(^ rI) ￿ VI(r) > b VI(^ rI) ￿ b VI(r) ￿ 0; where the second inequality





























for v > r:
This implies ￿(^ rI) > b ￿(^ rI) (using b2 ￿ 0; ^ rI > v0; and (14)). Hence, V 0
I(^ rI) >
b V 0
I(^ rI) = 0 = V 0
I(rI): This proves ^ rI 6= rI; and hence ^ rI < rI:
Our third and ￿nal theorem establishes that in the FPA, the seller sets a lower
reserve price if the bidders are more risk averse. The theorem requires that either the
bidders satisfy CARA, or that (DRH) holds and at least one of the two bidder utility
functions being compared satis￿es nonincreasing absolute risk aversion. The logic of
the result is twofold. First, under these conditions the FPA bid function increases
in the reserve price at a slower rate when the bidders are more risk averse. This
lowers the incentive of the seller to raise the reserve price. Second, because more
risk averse bidders bid more, the increase in their bids in response to an increase
in the reserve price generates a lower marginal utility increase for the (weakly) risk
averse seller. The proof re￿ ects these two forces.
Theorem 3 Let ^ uB satisfy the same assumptions as uB, with b RB > RB: Let RI
( b RI) be the set of optimal reserve prices for the seller given uB (^ uB): Then, for any
rI 2 RI and ^ rI 2 b RI; we have ^ rI < rI if either
15(a) (DRH) holds and RB and/or b RB is nonincreasing, or
(b) both uB and ^ uB satisfy CARA.
















The concavity of uS; together with ^ b(v;r) > b(v;r) (by Proposition 3(i)); yield
u0
S(^ b) ￿ u0
S(b) for v > r: Both (a) and (b) imply ^ b2 < b2 for v > r; by either
Proposition 3(iii) or equation (3) (which implies @ba
2=@a < 0). Hence, b V 0
I(r) < V 0
I(r)
for any r > L: Since rI 2 (v0;H) by Proposition 5, Lemma 2 now yields ^ rI < rI:
7 Concluding Discussion
We have shown that when the seller sets the reserve price, he sets it lower the
more risk averse he is and, in a ￿rst-price auction, the more risk averse the buyers
are. The seller￿ s optimal reserve price is lower in the ￿rst-price than in the second-
price auction, unless all parties are risk neutral. Risk aversion thus reduces the
probability of not selling the object when a buyer￿ s value for it exceeds that of the
seller, especially in the ￿rst-price auction.
The buyers may agree, ex ante, with the seller￿ s preference for the ￿rst-price
auction. Indeed, if they exhibit constant (or increasing) absolute risk aversion, every
type of buyer weakly (strictly) prefers at the interim stage the ￿rst-price to a second-
price auction that has the same reserve price (Matthews, 1987). Ipso facto, in these
cases the buyers prefer the ￿rst-price auction if it has the lower reserve price, as
it does when the seller sets the reserve price and he or the buyers are risk averse.
By continuity, the buyers must also prefer the ￿rst-price auction if their absolute
risk aversion measure is approximately constant, so long as they and/or the seller
are risk averse.10 More generally, buyers with values in the interval (rI;rII] strictly
10Formally, if jRB(y) ￿ aj < " for all y; and if a > 0 and/or RS > 0; then ￿ " > 0 exists such
16prefer the FPA, and hence so must the buyers with values in some interval (rI; ^ v);
where ^ v > rII.
We have focused tightly in this paper on the e⁄ects of risk aversion on optimal
reserve prices in two standard auctions, holding ￿xed their other features. Endoge-
nizing these other features and determining the e⁄ects of risk aversion on their levels
is a topic for future research. For example, if the seller is able to charge bidders an
entry fee, he may wish to do so if the bidders are risk averse (Maskin and Riley,
1983), but not if he is risk averse and can also set the reserve price (Waehrer et al.,
1998). The nature of optimal combinations of entry fees and reserves when the seller
or buyers are risk averse is unknown. Another example is entry: if each of a large
number of potential bidders must pay a cost to learn his value, the number of bidders
becomes endogenous. In this case the seller may want to lower the reserve price in
order to increase entry.11 Our results suggest that risk aversion on the part of the
seller or buyers should strengthen this e⁄ect, especially in the ￿rst-price auction.12.
Future work may also generalize the setting of our results. It may be fruitful,
for example, to consider asymmetric bidders with di⁄erent value distributions, which
give rise to a di⁄erent ex post ine¢ ciency (sale to the wrong bidder) than the one
(no sale) that we have considered. Settings with ex post risk or interdependent
values are naturally of interest as well.
that when " < ￿ "; every type of buyer interim prefers the FPA to the SPA when the seller sets the
reserve prices.
11The e⁄ects of endogenous entry on optimal reserve prices are studied, in risk neutral settings,
by McAfee and McMillan (1987), Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1993), and Levin and Smith (1994).
12Endogenous entry can reverse the seller￿ s preference for the FPA, since the SPA may induce
more entry if the buyers have DARA risk preferences, as is shown in Smith and Levin (1996). This
reversal should occur less often, however, when the seller sets the reserve price, since he sets it
lower in the FPA.
17Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) Proved in Milgrom (2004).13
(ii) Assume h(t) ￿ 0 for some t 2 (c;d]: The hypothesis and the continuity of h
imply the existence of ^ t 2 [c;t) such that h(^ t) < 0: Let ￿ s = supfs 2 [c;^ t) : h(s) ￿ 0g:
As h is continuous, ￿ s < ^ t and h(￿ s) = 0: The hypothesis now implies the existence of
s 2 (￿ s;^ t) such that h(s) > 0: This contradicts the de￿nition of ￿ s:
(iii) Assume h(t) ￿ 0 for some t 2 (c;d]: Let m be the largest minimizer of h on
[c;t]: Since h(c) ￿ h(t); m > c: We thus have h0(m) ￿ 0; as well as h(m) ￿ h(t) ￿ 0:
This contradicts the hypothesis.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let i 2 f1;2g be such that ti 2 (c;d); and let j 6= i be the
other index. Then h0
j(ti) 6= h0
i(ti) = 0: This proves hj(tj) > hj(ti); and hence t1 6= t2:
De￿ning h = h2 ￿h1; we now have h(t2) > h(t1): By the mean value theorem, there
exists t strictly between t1 and t2 such that
(t2 ￿ t1)h
0(t) = h(t2) ￿ h(t1) > 0:
This proves t1 < t2; since h0(t) > 0:
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